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THE SUPREME COURT, SECTION 301 AND NO-STRIKE
CLAUSES: FROM LINCOLN MILLS TO A VCO
AND BEYOND
HERBERT G. KEENE, JR.t
INTRODUCTION
N 1947 CONGRESS enacted section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
an innocuous-enough looking provision on its face, which opened
the doors of the federal courts to suits for violations of collective
bargaining agreements, between employers and labor organizations
in industries affecting commerce, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties.' Ten years later, in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,' the United States Supreme
Court held that section 301 was substantive as well as jurisdictional
in nature and directed the federal courts to commence fashioning a
body of federal common law to govern suits brought under section
301. This directive was intended to achieve two objectives: (1) the
development of a uniform body of national labor law, and (2) the
effective enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. These two
objectives collided head-on five years thereafter in Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Atkinson.3 Therein, the Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision, concluded
that federal courts were barred by the Norris-LaGuardia Act4 from
enjoining strikes in breach of no-strike clauses even though such strikes
were in violation of the very collective bargaining agreements for whose
enforcement section 301 had been enacted. Recently, in April 1968, the
Supreme Court held in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, I.A.M. &
A.W.5 that all actions brought for violations of collective bargaining
agreements, between employers and labor organizations in industries
t Member of the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia Bars. A.B., College of
the Holy Cross, 1958; LL.B., Georgetown University, 1963.
1. The Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C.§ 185 (1964), provides in pertinent part:(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of
the parties.(b) . . . Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in
behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States ....
2. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
3. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
4. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
5. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
(32) 1
Keene: The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincol
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
SECTION 301 AND NO-STRIKE CLAUSES
affecting commerce, including those instituted in state courts, arise
under section 301, are within the original jurisdiction of the federal
district courts and are, therefore, removable to those courts.' But, the
federal courts of course, are barred from issuing injunctions in labor
disputes by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.'
Whether, in the interests of uniform national labor law, state courts
are now bound by the proscriptions contained in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act with the result that they can no longer issue injunctions against
strikes in breach of no-strike clauses has not yet been answered.
However, if such be the case, the Supreme Court has achieved uni-
formity of national labor law at the sacrifice of the basic purpose
of section 301 which was to increase - not decrease - the enforce-
ability of collective bargaining agreements, including promises to arbi-
trate grievances, and their recognized "quid pro quo"' no-strike clauses.
It is the purpose of this paper to trace the path taken by the Supreme
Court which has led to this apparent impasse in national labor goals.
Also explored is a possible solution still available to the Court which,
if followed, would advance both the effective enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements and the continuing development of a uniform
national law of labor contracts. The underlying thesis is that Congress
never contemplated, let alone intended, the situation existing today with
respect to the enforcement, or more aptly, the non-enforcement, of the
no-strike clause; and, further, that the time is long over-due for either
the Court or Congress to rescue the no-strike clause from its judicially
legislated limbo or to bury it and be done with it. Our national law
of labor relations, in its day-to-day application, requires no less.
SECTION 301 AS SUBSTANTIVE LAW:
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills
Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act) of 1947,' amending the National Labor Relations Act
(Wagner Act),'0 for the purpose of redressing the imbalance of power
existing in the law in favor of labor unions as against employers.
6. The federal removal statute, which provides that a civil action commenced in
a state court may be removed to an appropriate federal district court when the claim
arises under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States and is within the
original jurisdiction of the federal district courts, may be found at 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1964).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
8. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). Even in
the absence of an express no-strike clause, an agreement to arbitrate grievances gives
rise to an implied promise not to strike during the term of the contract. Teamsters
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1964).
10. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1964).
FALL 1969]
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss1/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted to open the federal
courts to suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements and,
thereby, facilitate enforcement of such contracts by removing some
of the procedural disabilities blocking suits against unions in state
courts. The diverse common law rules of the various states had there-
tofore frequently frustrated all attempts to secure service of process
upon and execution of judgment against unions. Employers, on the
other hand, were easily sued. Congress designed section 301 to remedy
this inequitable situation; but no attempt was made to remove or re-
strict state court jurisdiction. Acting under the Commerce Clause,
Congress simply made the federal courts a proper forum for suits for
violations of labor contracts between employers and labor unions in
industries affecting interstate commerce and expedited the institution
of such suits against labor unions. In doing so, Congress plainly
meant to increase the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements
and thereby further insure industrial peace and tranquility.11
During the ten year period, 1947-1957, a split of opinion developed
among the circuit courts of appeals as to whether section 301 was
merely jurisdictional in nature or whether it contained substantive
content as well. This question was resolved by the Supreme Court
in 1957 in the landmark case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills12 in which a labor union instituted an action under section 301
in a federal district court seeking specific performance of the arbitra-
tion provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement. In
affirming the district court's grant of the requested relief, and reversing
the court of appeals, 8 the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Douglas for a five man majority, held that section 301 carried
substantive content and "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body
of federal law for the enforcement of ...collective bargaining agree-
ments and ... specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances.
S. . -Y14 The Court stated: "We conclude that the substantive law
to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law which the courts
must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws."' 5 Justices
Burton and Harlan concurred in the conclusion that the federal district
11. The significant legislative history of section 301 is contained in an appendix
to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 485-546 (1957).
12. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Supreme Court's holding in the earlier case of
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955), that section 301 was "a mere procedural provision" was later com-
pletely discredited as "no longer authoritative as precedent" in Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
13. 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956).
14. 353 U.S. at 451.
15. Id. at 456.
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court had jurisdiction to hear the suit but disagreed with the major-
ity's conclusion that the substantive law to be applied was federal law.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a lengthy and sharp opinion, dissented on
two principal grounds that: (1) section 301 was an unconstitutional
attempt to grant jurisdiction to federal courts over contracts created
by state substantive law in violation of the provisions respecting federal
judicial power stated in Article 3 of the Constitution; and (2)
section 301, in any event, was merely jurisdictional in nature, affording
a federal forum to suits for violations of labor contracts. Justice
Frankfurter attached a 62 page summary of the legislative history of
section 301 to his dissenting opinion in support of his belief that
section 301 did not call for the fashioning of a new body of federal
substantive law and predicted that there would be vast problems created
by the Court's decision since it brought into conflict state law and
federal law, and state courts and federal courts.16
A fair reading of the legislative history of section 301 would
seem to lend considerable support to Justice Frankfurter's view that
section 301 was intended to be merely procedural in nature. The
whole thrust of the section was to increase the enforceability of
collective bargaining agreements by permitting suits for their violation
to be brought not merely in state courts, as had formerly been the
case, but also in federal courts regardless of diversity of citizenship
or amount in controversy. Labor organizations, as unincorporated
associations, had proven themselves procedurally immune to suit in
several states whereas employers, as corporations, were easily sued.
The jurisdiction of state courts was not to be supplanted, but supple-
mented. Section 301 suits were to be subject to "the usual processes
of the law."'17 At the time of the adoption of section 301 these "proc-
esses," as administered by the state courts, included the several states'
own brands of both legal and equitable relief. Nonetheless, the holding
in Lincoln Mills was clear:
Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not
state law. . . . [S]tate law, if compatible with the purpose of
§ 301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best
effectuate the federal policy. . . .Any state law applied, however,
will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent
source of private rights.' 8
16. Id. at 462. Mr. Justice Frankfurter had previously expressed his views on this
subject in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
17. H.R. CONP. RmP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
18. 353 U.S. at 457.
FALL 1969]
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Undoubtedly, the majority of the Court believed that the development
of a body of uniform federal law governing suits for violations of
collective bargaining agreements would materially advance the purpose
of section 301 and increase the enforceability of such agreements.' 9
The question of whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act's proscriptions
against the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes prevented the
Court from decreeing specific performance of the employer's promise
to arbitrate grievances received short-shrift from the Court. Failure
to arbitrate was not viewed "as part and parcel of the abuses against
which the act was aimed.""0 Furthermore, the Court noted, section
8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act2' encourages arbitration of labor dis-
putes, for it denies injunctive relief to anyone who has failed to make
"every reasonable effort" to settle the dispute by negotiation, media-
tion, or "voluntary arbitration." Thus, concluded the Court, "we see
no justification in policy for restricting § 301(a) to damage suits,
leaving specific performance of a contract to arbitrate grievance dis-
putes to the inapposite procedural requirements of that Act."'2 2 Whether
a majority of the Court informally considered or discussed what
disposition it would make of a suit by an employer, rather than by
a labor union, to specifically enforce a union's no-strike promise, the
quid pro quo for the employer's arbitration promise, is, of course,
unknown. However, for a fleeting moment, at least, following the
Court's Lincoln Mills decision, the hope of employers that enforcement
would be granted in such a case found reasonably firm support in Mr.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion that violations of arbiration clauses
were without the "kinds of acts" against which Norris-LaGuardia
was aimed.
ARBITRATION - THE FAVORED MEANS:
THE Steelworkers Trilogy
In 1960, the Supreme Court set to work in developing the body
of federal labor contract law called for by Lincoln Mills. In the now-
famous Steelworkers' Trilogy of cases,23 the Court firmly established
19. See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. Riev. 1512, 1531-35 (1969).
20. 353 U.S. at 458.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
22. 353 U.S. at 458. In support of this conclusion, Mr. Justice Douglas referred
to the accommodation effected between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the RailwayLabor Act in Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949)
and Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937). These cases
would next be cited by Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, in the
dissent in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
23. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574(1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
[VOL. 15 : p. 32
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arbitration as the favored means for resolving industrial disputes and
later denominated it "a kingpin of federal labor policy." 4 In United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co.,2" an action by a union
to compel arbitration of a grievance had been dismissed by the lower
federal courts as frivolous and accordingly not subject to arbitration.
In reversing and remanding for arbitration, the Supreme Court held
that the function of the judiciary "is very limited when the parties
have agreed to submit all questions of contract and interpretation to
the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking
arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the
contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question
of contract interpretation for the arbitrator .... The courts, therefore,
have no business weighing the merits of the grievance . . 26 In
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,27
also an action by a union to compel arbitration of a grievance, the
lower federal courts had dismissed the union's complaint on the ground
that the asserted grievance fell outside the parties' arbitration agree-
ment. In reversing and remanding for arbitration, the Court stated:
"Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the
questions on which the parties disagree must therefore come within
the scope of the grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective
agreement. The grievance procedure is, in other words, a part of the
continuous collective bargaining process. It, rather than a strike,
is the terminal point of a disagreement. . ". ."" In the last of the
three cases, United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and
Car Corp.,29 the union instituted an action to enforce an arbitration
award. In reversing the Court of Appeals' refusal to do so, the Court
declared that "the question of interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's con-
struction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's
decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract
is different from his. . ."3 so long as the arbitrator stays within the
jurisdiction conferred upon him by the contract. The Trilogy thus
instructs the courts not to investigate the merits of either grievances
or arbitration awards, but to confine themselves to a consideration
24. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962).
25. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
26. Id. at 567-68.
27. Id. at 574.
28. Id. at 581.
29. Id. at 593.
30. Id. at 599.
FALL 1969]
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of the pure contract questions - did the parties agree to arbitration
of the dispute at hand and did the arbitrator, in issuing his award,
stay within the jurisdiction granted him by the parties' agreement?
If the answer to both of these questions is in the affirmative, then the
court, whether state or federal, is to enforce the arbitration award as
a matter of federal labor policy. In such a manner, the purpose of
section 301 to enhance the enforceability of collective bargaining
agreements is promoted and the directive of Lincoln Mills that there
be a federal common law of labor contracts is complied with. 1 In
addition, the mandate of Norris-LaGuardia that federal courts not
interfere in industrial disputes, a task for which they are concededly ill-
equipped, is preserved inviolate and extended to the arbitration process.
STATE COURT JURISDICTION:
Dowd Box AND Lucas Flour
The question of the state courts' continuing jurisdiction over
suits for violations of collective bargaining agreements between em-
ployers and unions engaged in commerce, following the sweeping
pronouncements of Lincoln Mills, was brought before the Court in 1962
in the case of Dowd Box v. Courtney. 2 Relying upon the legislative
history of section 301 the Court unequivocally held that "the basic
purpose of § 301 (a) was not to limit, but to expand, the availability
of forums for the enforcement of contracts made by labor organizations.
[Moreover,] there is explicit evidence that Congress expressly intended
not to encroach upon the existing jurisdiction of the state courts." 83
Jurisdiction over suits for the enforcement of labor contracts between
employers and unions engaged in commerce, accordingly, is not vested
exclusively in the federal courts. The state courts enjoy concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal courts over such actions. But, in keeping
with the dictates of Lincoln Mills, federal substantive law must ,be
applied, whether the forum be state or federal. The questions of whether
the Norris-LaGuardia Act might be applicable to a suit brought in a
state court for a union's violation of a labor agreement, and whether
such a suit could be removed to a federal court, were expressly reserved
for future disposition. 84
31. See Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute Arbitration:
The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MIcH. L. Rzv. 751 (1965) ; Givens, Section 301,
Arbitration and the No-Strike Clause, 11 LAB. L.J. 1005 (1960).
32. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
33. Id. at 508-09 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 514.
[VOL. 15 : p. 32
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During the same term, the case of Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas
Flour Co.,85 was decided by the Court. In an 8-1 decision, affirming
a state court's award of damages to an employer for a union's breach
of its no-strike clause, the Court expanded upon its Lincoln Mills'
directive that principles of federal substantive labor law be applied to
state-instituted section 301 actions. Emphasizing the problems that
might arise from a lack of uniformity between federal and state courts
in the interpretation and enforcement of labor contracts the Court
held that
incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles
of federal labor law. . . . The dimensions of § 301 require the
conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must
be paramount in the area covered by statute. Comprehensiveness
is inherent in the process by which the law is to be formulated
under the mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in
suits of a kind covered by § 301 to be decided according to the
precepts of federal labor policy. . . . [T]he subject matter of
§ 301 (a) "is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law." 6
Accordingly, concluded the Court, "we cannot but conclude that
in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law
uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules."8" However, because
the employer in this case did not seek specific performance of the
no-strike clause, but only money damages for its breach, the Court's
opinion was totally silent on the applicability of Norris-LaGuardia
to state court section 301 actions.
SECTION 301 AND NORRIS-LAGUARDIA:
Sinclair v. Atkinson
Born of another age when the union movement was in need of
protection against the federal courts' overzealous issuance of injunc-
tions in labor disputes, the Norris-LaGuardia Act absolutely prohibits
federal court injunctions against, inter alia, peaceful picketing and
strikes in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.8
35. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
36. Id. at 102-03.
37. Id. at 104.
38. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964), provides in
pertinent part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the follow-
ing acts:
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The Act also establishes severe procedural limitations on federal courts'
issuance of injunctions against any activity undertaken in connection
with a labor dispute even if such activity includes threats of violence
or other unlawful conduct. 9 In addition, however, as noted by Mr.
Justice Douglas in Lincoln Mills, the Act encourages resort to arbitra-
tion in labor disputes by prohibiting the federal courts from issuing
restraining orders or injunctions in favor of anyone who has failed
to make "every reasonable effort" to settle a dispute by negotiation,
mediation, or "voluntary arbitration. 40
The clash between the Norris-LaGuardia Act's proscriptions
against the grant of injunctive relief in labor disputes and the develop-
ing federal law of section 301 favoring full and ready enforcement
of labor contracts occurred in the now-famous case of Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson. 1 Therein, the employer instituted an action against
a union with which it had a collective bargaining agreement, com-
plaining that, in violation of the arbitration and no-strike provisions
of the contract, the union had over a period of some 19 months engaged
in work stoppages and strikes on 9 separate occasions, each of which
plainly grew out of a grievance which was subject to arbitration under
the contract, and, therefore, fell squarely within the union's promise
not to strike. The employer claimed that it had no adequate remedy
at law to protect its contractual rights and accordingly requested the
federal district court, in which it commenced the action, to enjoin the
union "preliminarily at first, and thereafter permanently, from aiding,
abetting, fomenting, advising, participating in, ratifying, or condoning
any strike, stoppage of work, slowdown or any other disruption of,
or interference with normal employment ... in support of, or because
of, any matter or thing which is, or could be, the subject of a grievance
under the grievance procedure of the said contract ... .""
The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia prohibited the Court from granting the
injunctive relief requested.4 3 The dismissal was sustained by the court
of appeals 44 and, in a decision of enormous impact, affirmed by the
Supreme Court by a 5-3 vote, with Mr. Justice Black delivering the
opinion of the Court.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1964).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
41. 370 U.S. 195 (1962). See also Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770,
F.2d --- (9th Cir. 1969), where the Ninth Circuit recently found Sinclair to be
controlling in similar circumstances.
42. Id. at 197-98.
43. 187 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1960).
44. 290 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1961).
[VOL. 15 : p. 32
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The Court held that (1) a dispute over a violation of a collective
bargaining agreement was a "labor dispute" within the meaning of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act; (2) section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act therefore prohibited the issuance of the requested injunctive relief;
and (3) section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act did not repeal, or other-
wise compromise or narrow, the proscriptions against injunctions
contained in Norris-LaGuardia.
In support of its conclusion that section 301 neither explicitly
nor impliedly repealed section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia so as to permit
federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements by enjoining strikes
in breach of them, the Court extensively reviewed and relied upon
section 301's legislative history. Although Congress' principal purpose
in enacting section 301 was to increase the enforceability of labor
contracts, the Court correctly observed that all attempts in Congress
to include a provision in section 301 repealing the anti-injunction
provisions of Norris-LaGuardia had been unsuccessful. While Congress
had specifically withdrawn certain sections of the National Labor
Relations Act (Wagner Act), as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act,
from the proscriptions of Norris-LaGuardia," it did not do so with
respect to section 301. In addition, subsection (e) of section 302
specifically repealed the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia
in certain cases involving payments made by employers to unions or
union representatives."'
Thus the failure of Congress to include a provision in § 301
expressly repealing the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act [was] evaluated in the context of a statutory
pattern that indicate[d] not only that Congress was completely
familiar with these provisions but also that it regarded an express
declaration of inapplicability as the normal and proper manner of
repealing them in situations where such repeal seemed desirable. 7
The bill passed by the House of Representatives had expressly
provided that Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction provisions would
not apply to section 301 suits. The Senate bill had provided that
the National Labor Relations Board, not private persons, could enjoin
breaches of collective bargaining agreements as unfair labor practices.
45. 61 Stat. 146, 155 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(h), 178(b) (1964).
Congress amended § 10(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, and § 208(b) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, by permitting injunctions to be obtained in certain kinds of cases
by the National Labor Relations Board or the Attorney General. See also §§ 10(j)
and 10(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j) and 160(1) (1964), of the Taft-Hartley Act em-
powering and, in some instances, requiring the N.L.R.B. to obtain injunctions in
labor cases.
46. 61 Stat. 157, 29 U.S.C. § 186(e) (1964).
47. 370 U.S. at 205.
FALL 1969]
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Following joint conference, however, neither of these provisions was
adopted. As Senator Taft, chairman of the Conference Committee,
explained the results of the joint conference to the Senate: "The Con-
ferees . . . rejected the repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."f4 8
Accordingly, the majority of the Court concluded that the legislative
history of section 301 amply demonstrated Congress' rejection of the
repeal of Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction provisions and that "[i]n
doing so, it [had] set the limit to which it was willing to go in
permitting courts to effectuate the congressional policy favoring arbitra-
tion"49 and the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. In so
concluding, the Court was undoubtedly correct as a matter of statutory
construction and interpretation. But since when were principles of
statutory construction, to the complete exclusion of considerations of
federal labor policy, utilized by the Court to resolve such basic ques-
tions in the law of labor relations and the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements? Certainly, there was precious little legislative
history to support the Court's conclusion in Lincoln Mills that section
301 called for the creation of a uniform national law of labor contracts.
As a matter of federal labor policy the decision of the majority in
Sinclair was, and still is, open to serious question.
THE DISSENT IN Sinclair - ACCOMMODATION
In a powerful dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Douglas and Harlan, took the Court to task on this score. Conceding
that "§ 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act did not, for purposes of actions
brought under it, 'repeal' § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ...", but
recognizing that "the two provisions do coexist [and] that they
apply to the case before us in apparently conflicting senses," Mr.
Justice Brennan saw the Court's duty as seeking out "that accommoda-
tion of the two which will give the fullest possible effect to the central
purposes of both. . . ."50 Thus, Mr. Justice Brennan would have re-
solved "the surface conflict between the two statutory commands"51
by "judicial accommodation, '52 that is, by reading them together as a
harmonizing whole. This, of course, would have resulted in placing
section 301 actions beyond the ambit of the anti-injunction provisions
of Norris-LaGuardia. In support of this theory of "accommodation,"
Mr. Justice Brennan pointed to earlier decisions of the Court in which
48. 93 CONG. REc. 6445-56 (1947), quoted in 370 U.S. at 208.
49. 370 U.S. at 213.
50. Id. at 215-16.
51. Id. at 217.
52. Id. at 224.
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Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction provisions were accommodated to
the objectives of the Railway Labor Act.5" Reliance was also placed
on the Court's decision in Lincoln Mills:
It is strange, I think, that § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act need not be read, in the face of § 301, to impose inept pro-
cedural restrictions upon the specific enforcement of an employer's
contractual duty to arbitrate, but that § 4 [of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act] must be read, despite § 301, to preclude absolutely
the issuance of an injunction against a strike which ignores a
union's identical duty."4
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brennan did not believe that either
section 301 or its legislative history required the majority's decision;
the legislative history of section 301 was viewed as ambiguous at
best. In the light of Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy,
section 301 surely was not limited to damage actions. More likely
than not, Congress never anticipated that a body of law would develop
around section 301 in such a manner as to bring it into a head-on
collision with Norris-LaGuardia. In such a situation, concluded the
dissent, appropriate resolution of the statutory "surface conflict" lies
in "judicial accommodation" of the competing interests. In the view
of the dissent, the power to enjoin a strike over an arbitrable grievance
was "essential to the uncrippled performance of the Court's function
under § 301." 55
Mr. Justice Brennan then addressed himself to the confusion,
he felt, the majority's decision had created in the development of a
uniform body of federal law governing suits under section 301:
The question arises whether today's prohibition of injunctive
relief is to be carried over to state courts as a part of the federal
law governing collective agreements. If so, § 301, a provision
plainly designed to enhance the responsibility of unions to their
contracts, will have had the opposite effect of depriving employers
of a state remedy they enjoyed prior to its enactment.
On the other hand if, as today's literal reading suggests ...
States remain free to apply their injunctive remedies against con-
53. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353
U.S. 30, 40 (1957), the Court concluded that there "must be an accommodation of
[the Norris-LaGuardia Act] and the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purpose
in the enactment of each is preserved." See also Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949) and Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40,
300 U.S. 515, 562-63 (1937), which as stated in note 22 supra, were relied upon by
Mr. Justice Douglas in Lincoln Mills in support of the majority's conclusion that
Norris-LaGuardia did not prevent specific enforcement of an employer's promise to
arbitrate grievances.
54. 370 U.S. at 219-20.
55. Id. at 216-17.
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certed activities in breach of contract, the development of a uni-
form body of federal contract law is in for hard times. So long
as state courts remain free to grant the injunctions unavailable
in federal courts, suits seeking relief against concerted activities
in breach of contract will be channeled to the States whenever
possible. Ironically, state rather than federal courts will be the
preferred instruments to protect the integrity of the arbitration
process, which Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers decisions forged
into a kingpin of federal labor policy. Enunciation of uniform
doctrines applicable in such cases will be severely impeded. More-
over, the type of relief available in a particular instance will turn
on fortuities of locale and susceptibility to process - depending
upon which States have anti-injunction statutes and how they
construe them.
I have not overlooked the possibility that removal of the
state suit to the federal court might provide the answer to these
difficulties. But if § 4 is to be read literally, removal will not
be allowed. And if it is allowed, the result once again is that§ 301 will have had the strange consequence of taking away a
contract remedy available before its enactment. 56
Sinclair's IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH - FEDERAL REMOVAL
The fact that Sinclair raised more questions than it answered is
undeniable. Mr. Justice Brennan's "judicial accommodation" theory
would have settled these issues before they arose but, of course, those
views did not carry the day. The most important question left in
the wake of Sinclair was whether the anti-injunction provisions of
Norris-LaGuardia were now part of the federal common law of section
301 heralded by Lincoln Mills and, therefore, to be applied by the
states in section 301 actions in keeping with the decision in Lucas
Flour, despite section 301's clear purpose to increase - not decrease -
the effective enforcement of collective bargaining contracts. While
Sinclair did not restrict or limit federal court jurisidiction, as it has
existed since the time of the passage of Norris-LaGuardia, the applica-
tion of Norris-LaGuardia to state court section 301 actions would
obviously extend the anti-injunction provisions of that Act into an
area - the states - previously free of such restrictions unless
voluntarily enacted in a state's own laws."
56. Id. at 226-27.
57. For excellent but differing appraisals of the Sinclair decision and its impact,
see Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions,
63 COLUM. L. Rgv. 1027 (1963) ; Hanslowe, Labor Relations Law, 16 SYRAcuse L.Rtv. 244, 254 (1965) ; Moskowitz, Enforcement of No-Strike Clauses By Injunction,
46 B.U.L. Rev. 343 (1966) ; Note, Specific Enforcement of No-Strike Clauses: The
Enigma of Sinclair v. Atkinson, 19 RUTGERS L. Rev. 507 (1965).
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However, with state courts, jealous of their otherwise rapidly
contracting jurisdiction, and, therefore, hardly ready to adopt such
a view, the more immediate problem was whether state court actions
under section 301, as permitted by Dowd Box, were subject to removal
to federal district courts as suits arising under a law of the United
States, i.e., section 301, and within the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts. In an attempt to avoid such removal, employers faced
with strikes or work stoppages in violation of labor contracts, com-
menced the practice of not including damage claims in their state
suits for injunctions against such activities. This practice was adopted
on the theory that since section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia uses the
language "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order," a state suit for only an injunction could
not be removed to a federal district court as one within the original
jurisdiction of the federal courts; whereas, if a damage claim for
breach of the labor contract were included, a federal court might with
more justification choose to assert its jurisdiction and, in its exercise
thereof, dismiss the request for injunctive relief as beyond its power
under Norris-LaGuardia, thereby leaving the employer with damages
only, a weak substitute for performance of the labor agreement. 8
With this adjustment in pleadings, employer's attorneys continued
to seek and obtain state court injunctions against strikes in violation
of collective bargaining agreements comfortable in the thought that
removal would be denied because of Norris-LaGuardia's no-juris-
diction language. This view reached its apogee in 1964 in the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in American Dredging v. Marine
Local 25." Therein, on a motion by the employer to remand its suit
for an injunction against a strike in breach of its labor contract to
a state court, it was held that (1) the action was based "solely on
a state-created right to bring suit for violation of a collective bargaining
agreement and sought only a remedy available under state law . . ."";
(2) the action, therefore, did not arise under section 301 or any other
law of the United States; and (3) the action was not within the origi-
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court
may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not
otherwise within its original jurisdiction.
59. 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965). See also
California Packing Co. v. Local 142 ILWU, 253 F. Supp. 597 (D. Hawaii 1966);
Dixie Machine Welding & Metal Works v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 243
F. Supp. 489 (E.D. La. 1965) ; Merchants Refrigerating Co. v. Warehouse Union,
213 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
60. 338 F.2d at 846.
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nal jurisdiction of the district court because, under Norris-LaGuardia,
the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain and determine
the suit. Accordingly, the Court directed that the case be remanded
to the state court as having been improperly removed at the behest
of the union.
Other federal courts, however, had reached the contrary result
holding that all actions for violations of collective bargaining contracts
arose under section 301, were within the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts, i.e., the federal courts possessed the capacity to enter-
tain although not to determine such suits, and were therefore re-
movable.6 A split of opinion on this issue developed in the Courts
of Appeals during 1966 and 1967 with the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Johnson v. England,62 and the Sixth Circuit's decision in Avco Corp.
v. Aero Lodge No. 735, I.A.M. & A.W."3  Both these Courts of
Appeal expressly declined to follow the Third Circuit's decision in
American Dredging and refused to remand employer's suits for in-
junctive relief against strikes in breach of no-strike clauses to state
courts. The Sixth Circuit held in Avco that (1) in the light of
Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour "State law does not exist as an inde-
pendent source of private rights to enforce collective bargaining con-
tracts . . .,,14; (2) the employer's contention that its action was
founded upon a breach of contract arising under state law was therefore
without merit; and (3) the action was within the district court's
original jurisdiction for that court possessed the capacity to entertain
it, although it was without power to grant the kind of injunctive
relief requested. The Sixth Circuit opinion in Avco further stated
that even if the action had remained in the state court, the state court,
in keeping with Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour, would have had to
apply federal labor law and, consequently, would have been "limited
to the remedies available under Federal law . . ."I" which, of course,
in the light of Sinclair, do not include injunctions against strikes in
breach of collective agreements.
61. See, e.g., Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Hall, 276 F. Supp. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Sealtest Foods Division v. Conrad, 262 F. Supp. 623 (N.D.N.Y. 1966); Publishers'
Ass'n v. Newspaper Union, 246 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Tri-Boro Bagel Co.
v. Bakery Union, 228 F. Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) ; Crestwood Dairy, Inc. v. Kelley,
222 F. Supp. 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
62. 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1966).
63. 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967).
64. Id. at 340.
65. Id. at 343.
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FEDERAL REMOVAL UPHELD:
Avco Corp v. Aero Lodge 735
With a direct conflict between Circuits, the Supreme Court
granted a writ of certiorari in the Avco case and, on April 8, 1968,
in a rather brief opinion, without dissent, affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
judgment upholding federal removal of section 301 actions."8 Citing
Lincoln Mills, the Court held that a suit for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement between an employer or union in an industry
affecting commerce arises under section 301, a law of the United
States, and is within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts for
"the breadth or narrowness of the relief which may be granted under
federal law in § 301 cases is a different question from whether the
court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter ...
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1337 says that, 'The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under
any Act of Congress regulating commerce .... ' It is that original
jurisdiction that a § 301 action invokes.""7
The Court, however, reserved decision on the question of whether
"the remedies available in State Courts are limited to the remedies
available under Federal law," 8 saying "[t]hat conclusion would sug-
gest that state courts are precluded by § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
from issuing injunctions in labor disputes, even though the defendant
does not exercise his right - which we confirm today - to remove the
case to the District Court . . . . We have no occasion to resolve that
matter here, since respondents did elect to have the case removed."69
The Court also expressed no opinion on the district court's dissolution
of the state court-issued injunction observing "[w]hether it did so
because it felt that action was required by Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Atkinson . ..or because of its equity powers or both is not clear.""
The concurring Justices expressed their hope that the Court would
"have an opportunity to reconsider the scope and continuing validity
of Sinclair upon an appropriate future occasion. 111
The Court's decision in Avco thus laid to rest the question of the
removability of suits for breaches of collective bargaining agreements
66. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, I.A.M. & A.W., 390 U.S. 557 (1968)(Justices Stewart, Harlan and Brennan concurring).
67. 390 U.S. at 561-62.
68. Id. at 560, n.2.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 561, n.4.
71. Id. at 562. It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Brennan concurred in the
result in Avco, despite his statement in his dissent in Sinclair that removal should be




Villanova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss1/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
but did nothing to clarify the question of the impact of Sinclair upon
state courts. The two critical questions - does Lincoln Mills require
the state courts to apply Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction provisions
to state-instituted section 301 actions as part of the federal substantive
law of labor contracts; and, does Sinclair require federal district courts
to which state-commenced section 301 suits have been removed to
dissolve state-issued injunctions as in violation of Norris-LaGuardia
remain unanswered.
The strongest federal authority in support of the state courts'
continuing jurisdiction to issue injunctions in section 301 suits is
undoubtedly the Third Circuit's opinion in American Dredging which,
although now overruled by Avco on the issue of federal removability,
extensively reviewed the legislative and decisional history of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and concluded that the Act, "enacted as it
was under Congress' constitutionally granted power to regulate the
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, limits only the jurisdiction of
such courts; that the Act did not preempt the field with respect to
litigation of the type here involved; and Congress cannot constitu-
tionally limit the remedial powers of state courts where it has not
preempted the field." '72 In other words, removal or not, state courts
remain free to issue -injunctions against breaches of collective bargaining
agreements provided only their own laws do not prohibit the issuance
of such decrees.73
However, at least two post-Avco federal decisions have held
otherwise.' In General Electric Co. v. Local 191,"5 the Fifth Circuit
affirmed dissolution of a state court-issued injunction following removal
of the action to a federal district court, saying: "We are of the view
that the District Court did not err in dissolving the injunction, not
because either either [sic] Sinclair . . . or Avco . . . explicitly dictates
that result, but because, in our view, once this case was removed, a
failure to dissolve the state court injunction would have been tanta-
mount to issuance of that same injunction by the federal district court,
which, as we have just noted, would be proscribed by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act under the Sinclair decision. [T]he case . . . having
been removed as one falling within the District Court's original federal
question, rather than diversity, jurisdiction, federal law is applicable." 76
The decision in Day-Brite Lighting Division v. I.B.E.W.,77 rendered
72. 338 F.2d 837, 855 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1964).
73. See Ford v. Boeger, 362 F.2d 999, 1005 (8th Cir. 1966).
74. As, indeed, does the Sixth Circuit's 1967 opinion in the Avco case itself.
75. 71 L.R.R.M. 2903 (5th Cir. 1969).
76. 71 L.R.R.M. at 2904.
77. 72 L.R.R.M. 2054 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
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subsequent to, but not relying on, General Electric, restates the same
position: "Federal jurisdiction being present, this court is required to
dissolve the ex parte state court injunction which issued in a labor
dispute affecting interstate commerce. § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act so requires. . . The state court injunction must be dissolved,
not on the ground of its unlawfulness but because of paramount federal
labor policy .... "78
The practical effect of Avco has, therefore, been to increase the
already great concern of employers for the continuing enforceability
of no-strike clauses - at least in state courts. Although 24 of the 50
states have "little Norris-LaGuardia Acts" on their books, 79 10 such
states do not apply their acts to strikes in violation of collective bar-
gaining agreements.80  Consequently, with "little Norris-LaGuardia
Acts" an effective bar to state court injunctions in section 301 suits
in only 14 states, the magnitude and potential impact of the issue posed
by Sinclair and left unanswered in Avco is immediately apparent.81
78. 72 L.R.R.M. at 2059.
79. These are Arizona, ARIZ. R v. STAT. ANN. § 12-1808 (1956); Colorado,
COLO. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 80-4-16 (1963); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. RgV. §§
31-112-13 (1958); Hawaii, HAWAII Rv. LAWS § 380 (Supp. 1963) ; Idaho, IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 44--706 (1948); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 2a (Smith-Hurd
1950); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-501 (1965); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-904 (1964); Louisiana, LA. &~v. STAT. ANN. § 23.841 (1964); Maine, ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 5 (1964) ; Maryland, MD. ANN. COD art. 100, §§ 63-75 (1957);
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 9A (1958); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. § 185.02-19 (1966); Montana, MONT. Rvv. CODES ANN. § 93-4203 (1947);
New Jersey, N.J. Rnv. STAT. § 2A: 15-51-58 (1951); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 59-2-1 (1953) ; New York, N.Y. LABOR LAW § 807 (1965) ; North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 34-08-01 (1959) ; Oregon, ORE. Rev. STAT. § 662.010 (1965) ; Pennsyl-
vania, PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 206(a) (1965) ; Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.§ 28-70-2 (1968); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.010 (1961); Wisconsin,
WIs. STAT. § 103.56 (1963); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-239 (1957).
80. Colorado, COLO. R~v. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-6(2) (c) (1963) ; Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-809(15) (1964) ; Louisiana, act declared unconstitutional in Doublas
Publ. Serv. Corp. v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74 So. 2d 192 (1954) ; Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. § 179.11(1) (1961), see McLean Distrib. Co. v. Brewery Drivers Union, 254
Minn. 204, 94 N.W.2d 514, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 917 (1959) ; Montana, see State v.
District Court, 61 L.R.R.M. 2159 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1965) ; New York, post-Sinclair;
Perry & Sons v. Robilotto, 23 App. Div. 2d 949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965) ; Stretcher-
Traung Lithograph Corp. v. Lithographers Union, 46 Misc. 2d 925, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1011(Sup. Ct. 1965): Thaddeus Suski Productions, Inc. v. Vola, 47 Misc. 2d 773, 263
N.Y.S.2d 275, af'd, 24 App. Div. 559, 260 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1965); Employer's Ass'n
v. Operating Engineers, 60 L.R.R.M. 2006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Eastern Freight-
ways, Inc. v. Deperno, 57 L.R.R.M. 2299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (not officially re-
ported). Pre-Sinclair: Dairymen's Ass'n v. Conrad, 16 App. Div. 2d 869, 229
N.Y.S.2d 736 (1962); Anchor Motor Freight Corp. v. Teamsters Local 445, 5 App.
Div. 2d 869, 171 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1958); McClean Trucking v. Doyle, 8 App. Div. 2d
789, 188 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1959); Oregon, see Weisfield, Inc. v. Haeckel, 28 L.R.R.M.
2055 (Ore. Cir. Ct. 1951) ; Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 206(d) (a) (1963) ; see
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. I.L.A., 382 Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1956) ; Washington, injunction provisions of Act declared
unconstitutional in Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397(1936), see also Associated Gen'l Contractors v. Trout, 59 Wash. 2d 90, 366 P.2d 16(1961); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT.§ 111.06(2)(c) (1963).
81. In an interesting post-Avco decision, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held in Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150 (D.C. Cir.
1969), that an employer did not violate his duty to bargain by insisting on a contract
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NORRIS-LAGUARDIA AND THE STATES:
McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters
Since Sinclair, a number of states have had occasion to determine
the applicability of the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act to section 301 actions instituted in their courts and, as
might be expected, the large majority of them have held those provi-
sions inapplicable.8 2 The earliest and still the leading state court de-
cision on this issue is McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District
Council of Carpenters8 in which Justice (now Chief Justice) Traynor
of the Supreme Court of California, correctly anticipating the later
Supreme Court holdings in Dowd Box, Lucas Flour and Sinclair,
concluded that, although federal courts are restricted in granting in-
junctions in section 301 suits by Norris-LaGuardia, "state courts
enforcing federal rights are not necessarily subject to the same re-
straint." 4 In support of this conclusion, Chief Justice Traynor argued
that "whether or not Congress could deprive state courts of the
power to give such [equitable] remedies when enforcing collective
bargaining agreements, it has not attempted to do so either in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act or section 301."8 The Norris-LaGuardia Act,
arbitration clause allowing for state court injunctions in the event of the union's
breach of a no-strike clause in their labor contract, and by demanding that the union
waive its right to seek removal of such an action to a federal district court.
82. Compare, e.g., Dean v. Scott Paper Co., 70 L.R.R.M. 3330 (Ala. Sup. Ct.
1969) ; Leon Oil Co. v. Marsh, 220 Ark. 678, 249 S.W.2d 569 (1952) ; United Con-
crete Pipe Corp. v. Laborers, Local 89, 231 Cal. App. 2d 315, 41 Cal. Rep. 816 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1964) ; Radio Corp. of America v. Local 780, IATSE, 160 So. 2d 150 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965) ; American Device Mfg. Co.
v. Machinists, 70 L.R.R.M. 2563 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969); Dugdale Constr. Co. v. Opera-
tive Plasterers, 257 Iowa 997, 135 N.W.2d 656 (1965); Armco Steel Corp. v. Perkins,
411 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) ; Rust Engineering Co. v. Carpenters Local 403,
69 L.R.R.M. 2115 (La. Ct. App. 1968); McLean Distributing Co. v. Brewery &
Beverage Drivers, 254 Minn. 204 94 N.W.2d 514 (1959) ; Masonite Corp. v. Wood-
workers Union, 69 L.R.R.M. 2831 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1968); Curtis v. Tozer, 374
S.W.2d 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) ; State v. District Court, 61 L.R.R.M. 2159 (Mont.
Sup Ct. 1965) ; Thaddeus Suski Productions, Inc. v. Vola, 47 Misc. 2d 773, 263
N.Y.S.2d 275 (1965), aff'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 559, 260 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1965); C.D.
Perry & Sons, Inc. v. Robilotto, 39 Misc. 2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1963),
aff'd, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965); General Electric Co. v. International Union, 93
Ohio App. 139, 108 N.E.2d 211 (1952); Shaw Elec. Co. v. IBEW, 318 Pa. 1, 208
A.2d 769 (1965); I.L.A. v. Producers Grain Corp., 70 L.R.R.M. 2375 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1969); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Galveston Maritime Ass'n, 358
S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) ; Associated Gen. Contractors v. Trout, 59 Wash.
2d 90, 366 P.2d 16 (1961) (holding state courts free to issue injunctions in section
301 suits) with Tidewater Express Lines, Inc. v. Freight Drivers Local 557, 230 Md.
450, 187 A.2d 685 (1963); Independent Oil Workers v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 85
N.J. Super. 453, 205 A.2d 78 (1964) (holding Norris-LaGuardia bar to state courts'
issuance of injunctions in section 301 suits). See generally Aaron, Labor Injunctions
in the State Courts, 50 VA. L. Rxv. 951, 1147 (1964).
83. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
84. Id. at 63, 315 P.2d at 331. Chief Justice Traynor's opinion was rendered on
behalf of the Supreme Court of California, sitting en banc, with one justice dissenting.
85. Id. at 61, 315 P.2d at 332.
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it was pointed out, was drawn as a limitation on the federal courts
and "was justified constitutionally on the basis of Congress' power
to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.186  Chief Justice
Traynor contended that "[i]t did not limit the remedial power of
the state courts . . . and could not constitutionally have done so since
its prohibition was not restricted to injunctions in labor disputes
affecting interstate commerce or any other subject over which Congress
has paramount power. 87 Furthermore, he found nothing in section
301 requiring a state court enforcing rights governed by that section
to deny injunctive relief:
The principal purpose of section 301 was to facilitate the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements by making unions
suable as entities in the federal courts, and thereby to remedy the
one-sided character of existing labor legislation. . . . We would
give altogether too ironic a twist to this purpose if we held that
the actual effect of the legislation was to abolish in state courts
equitable remedies that had been available and leave an employer
in a worse position in respect to the effective enforcement of his
contract than he was before the enactment of section 301.8
Finally, Chief Justice Traynor argued that while "[u]niformity in
the determination of the substantive federal right itself is no doubt
a necessity, ... such uniformity is not threatened because a state
court can give a more complete and effective remedy. . . . [A] state
court is not confined to remedies available in a federal court when
the restriction on the federal court does not flow from the statute
creating the federal right."8 9
The single dissenter in McCarroll, citing the Lincoln Mills mandate
that a body of uniform federal law be developed to govern section 301
suits, contended that "the rights under the bargaining agreement
being controlled by federal law, that law must also measure the remedies
available for otherwise the federal law is not being applied."9 A
state court's grant of injunctive relief was viewed as a remedy going
to the "very essence of the right itself .... A 'State may not prohibit
the exercise of rights which the federal Acts protect.' . . . [T]he right
to be not enjoined under the Norris-LaGuardia Act .. . is a part of
86. Id.
87. Id. The Act was undoubtedly framed in jurisdictional terms to insure its
constitutionality. An earlier state anti-injunction statute had been held to violate the
fourteenth amendment. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). It was not until
1937, five years after Norris-LaGuardia, that Congressional power to regulate labor
relations was held to be within the Commerce Clause. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
88. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 61, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1968).
89. Id. at 64, 315 P.2d at 332-33.
90. Id. at 70, 315 P.2d at 336.
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the federal right - a part and parcel of the rights which may be
exercised with reference to bargaining agreements." 91  The dissent
then concluded "In short the federal law is exclusive -in the field of
bargaining agreements affecting commerce. When a state entertains
jurisdiction and applies that law it should be bound by all the important
restrictions including those embraced in the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 2
In support of the dissent's position, it can certainly be said that
the trend toward uniform federal labor policy has been accelerated,
not de-celerated, in recent years.93 Furthermore, any substantive-pro-
cedural distinction is probably without merit where, as here, the
drawing of such a distinction would result in different outcomes
depending upon whether the action was brought in a state or federal
court. The availability of injunctive relief only in state courts can
therefore probably be characterized as prohibitively "outcome deter-
minative" within the meaning of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins94 and
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.9" However, if the Supreme Court's
decision in Sinclair is any guide to what the ultimate disposition of
the question of the availability of injunctive relief in state court section
301 suits will be, the cogency of Chief Justice Traynor's majority
opinion -in McCarroll must be admitted."
THE QUESTION REMAINS
The Supreme Court rested its decision in Sinclair primarily on
Congressional intent as evidenced in the legislative history of section
91. Id. at 72-74, 315 P.2d at 338, quoting United Mine Workers v. Arkansas
Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956).
92. Id. at 74, 315 P.2d at 339.
93. Consider the unfair labor practice area in which state courts are virtually
without jurisdiction today, exclusive primary jurisdiction over any conduct "arguably"
subject to the Labor-Management Relations Act having been vested in the National
Labor Relations Board, and injunctive relief against such "arguable" conduct available
only at the behest of the N.L.R.B. in the federal courts, absent violence, coercion or
the like. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
94. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
95. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). This is obviously reverse Erie reasoning in that, were
it to be applied, state courts would be required to apply federal law, rather than
federal courts, state law. However, this approach would hardly be novel today. Cf.
Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions - The Converse of the Erie
Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 384 (1956).
96. For another well-reasoned and more recent state court opinion reaching the
same conclusion, see the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Shaw
Electric Co. v. I.B.E.W., 418 Pa. 1 (1965), in which Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for
the majority of the court, concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as enacted by
Congress, limits only the jurisdiction of the federal courts; that the Act did not
pre-empt the field with respect to the issuance of labor injunctions; and that nothing
in the legislative history of section 301 "remotely suggests that Congress intended to
amend the Norris-LaGuardia Act so as to extend its anti-injunction limitations to
state courts .... Where such a legislative declaration of policy is in terms addressed
to federal courts only, we do not read Lucas Flour as finding in § 301 warrant for
transcending that limitation and restricting traditional state remedies. Id. at 8,
13 n.19.
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301. All attempts in Congress to include a provision in section 301
repealing the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia were
notably unsuccessful. This same legislative history, however, supports
the contrary result with respect to state court injunctions. The House
Conference Report stated that enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements was -to be left to "the usual processes of law."'97 In 1947,
these "usual processes of law" did not include federal court injunc-
tions 'but did include state court injunctions. In the Senate debate
in 1946, Senator Ferguson, a spokesman for section 301, unequivocally
stated that state court jurisdiction would not be ousted by its enactment:
MR. FERGUSON. Mr. President, there is nothing whatever in
the now-being-considered amendment which takes away from the
State courts all the present rights of the State courts to adjudicate
the rights between parties in relation to labor agreements. The
amendment merely says that the Federal courts shall have juris-
diction. It does not attempt to take away the jurisdiction of the
State courts ...
MR. MURRAY. But it authorizes the employers to bring
suit in the Federal courts, if they so desire.
MR. FERGUSON. That is correct. That is all it does. It
takes away no jurisdiction of the State courts. 98
Moreover, the Supreme Court has itself already explicitly recog-
nized Congress' clear intent in enacting section 301. In its 1962
decision in Dowd Box, the Court declared:
The legislative history of the enactment nowhere suggests
that, contrary to the clear import of the statutory language, Con-
gress intended in enacting § 301(a) to deprive a party to a
collective bargaining contract of the right to seek redress for
its violation in an appropriate state tribunal.
The legislative history makes clear that the basic purpose of
§ 301 (a) was not to limit, but to expand, the availability of forums
for the enforcement of contracts made by labor organizations.
Moreover, there is explicit evidence that Congress expressly in-
tended not to encroach upon the existing jurisdiction of the
state courts.
In considering these provisions of the proposed legislation
in 1946, Congress manifested its complete awareness of both the
existence and the limitations of state court remedies for violation
of collective agreements.
The clear implication of the entire record of the congressional
debates in both 1946 and 1947 is that the purpose of conferring
97. H.R. CoNp. RxP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947).
98. 92 CoNG. Rzc. 5708 (1946).
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jurisdiction upon the federal district courts was not to displace,
but to supplement, the thoroughly considered jurisdiction of the
various States over contracts made by labor organizations.
[T]he entire tenor of the 1947 legislative history confirms
that the purpose of § 301 . . . was to fill the gaps in the juris-
dictional law of some of the States, not to abolish existing state
court jurisdiction.!"
In addition, Norris-LaGuardia, of course, was framed in terms
of restrictions on federal courts' jurisdiction. As pointed out above,'
it was not until 5 years after Norris-LaGuardia that Congressional
power to regulate labor relations was constitutionally established as
within the Commerce Clause.
Thus, if the question of the power of state courts to continue
to issue injunctions for violations of no-strike clauses is to be resolved,
as was Sinclair, on the basis of section 301's legislative history, state
courts should be permitted to continue to enjoy such power. However,
the disparate results in state and federal courts, which such a ruling
would perpetuate, are concededly undesirable. Furthermore, to permit
injunctions in state court actions, but only if they are not removed
to the federal courts, is obviously no answer at all. The only satis-
factory solution to this dilemma would, therefore, seem to be in
Congressional amendment of section 301 providing either for the
repeal of Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction provisions in such suits
or, the converse, an absolute prohibition against the grant of injunctions
in such suits. 101 Of course, if one understands the Court's decision in
Sinclair as having read section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia into section
301, the Court has already opted for the latter alternative. Further,
unless one reads the Court's opinion in Avco as merely a federal
procedural decision, limited to the question of removal, this conclusion
is reinforced. That the Congress of 1946-47 never contemplated, let
alone intended, this state of affairs seems evident. It would therefore
appear to be high-time that Congress brought a halt to this judicially
created imbroglio and made known its intent in this most important
area of our national law of labor relations. 02
99. 368 U.S. at 507-12.
100. See note 63 supra.
101. Whether, in the absence of new le *slation pre-empting the field, Congress
could be found to have constitutionally precluded the issuance of state court injunc-
tions in section 301 suits, is a most serious question. For negative opinions, see
Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council
of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 61-63 315 P.2d 322, 331-32 (1957) and American
Dredging Co. v. Marine Local 25, 338 F.2d 837, 855 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 935 (1965).
102. For discussions of the state courts' proper role in this area, see Janofsky &
Vaughn, The Affirmative Role of State Courts to Enjoin Strikes in Breach of Coilec-
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INJUNCTION BY ARBITRATION - AN ALTERNATIVE?
However, even if Congress should choose not to act in this area,
and the Supreme Court should ultimately hold Norris-LaGuardia's
anti-injunction provisions applicable to state court section 301 actions,
it may nevertheless be too early to sound the death knell for no-
strike clauses. An alternative - the product of the ingenuity of
lawyers for end-runs and the genius of our law for needed adjust-
ment - may exist. Nothing said thus far has considered the case
in which an employer brings an action under section 301 to enforce
an arbitration award which has the effect of enjoining a strike in
breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The fact that it is an
arbitration award, which such a suit would seek to enforce, rather
than a bare no-strike clause, could quite conceivably lead to a wholly
different result. The Supreme Court might consider itself free to
affirm judicial enforcement of an arbitration award, upholding and en-
forcing a no-strike clause, on the theory that an arbitration award
derives its authority from the voluntary agreement of the parties to
the labor contract rather than from our national labor laws as such.
Such a holding would be in complete accord with the Court's decisions
in Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy, would be in harmony
with the purpose of section 301 to increase the enforceability of collec-
tive bargaining contracts, and, conceivably, would be outside the in-
junction proscriptions of Norris-LaGuardia applicable to labor disputes
as a result of the parties' contractual agreement to be bound by
arbitration awards. Sinclair involved a raw labor dispute which had
not been submitted to arbitration. Further, Norris-LaGuardia, it
should be remembered, itself encourages the settlement of disputes
"either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental
machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.' '10 3 Thus, the arbitra-
tion process could lead to a whole new - and even greater - life
for no-strike clauses, provided the employer has access to the arbitra-
tor for management grievances, 10 4 the arbitrator possesses the authority
to enter an award enjoining a strike in violation of the agreement,'
tive Bargaining Agreements, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rtv. 869 (1966); Lesnick, State-
Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: Beyond Norris-
LaGuardia, 79 HARv. L. Rev. 757 (1966); Stern, The Increasing Unavailability of
State Injunctions for Breaches of N-Strke Provisions Under Section 301, 40 PA.
BAR Ass'N Q. 143 (1968).
103. 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
104. See Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), the companion
case to Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
105. See Gulf & South Am. S.S. Co. v. Maritime Union, 360 F.2d 63 (5th Cir.
1966) ; Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. Rxv. 1199 (1962).
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and the judicial enforcement of such an award is determined not to
be violative of Norris-LaGuardia's proscriptions against injunctions
in labor disputes.
I.L.A. v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n
During its 1967-1968 term, the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to decide this question, but failed to do so, in Local 1291, I.L.A. v.
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n. 0 The case arose out of a series
of strikes along the Philadelphia waterfront. The Philadelphia Marine
Trade Association (P.M.T.A.), the employer group, had a collective
bargaining agreement with Local 1291, I.L.A., which included a
broad grievance and arbitration provision. A controversy arose over
the interpretation of a section of a memorandum of settlement (settling
an earlier strike) entered pursuant to and forming a part of the
agreement. The parties followed the grievance procedure of the agree-
ment and submitted the matter to an arbitrator. The arbitrator ruled
in favor of the employer association and against the interpretation
urged by the union.1 7 Three months and two strikes later the same
dispute again erupted between the parties. This time the employer
association instituted proceedings in the district court, under section
301, to enforce the earlier arbitration award. The district court
ordered the arbiration award "be specifically enforced by defendant,
International Longshoremen's Association Local 1291, and the said
defendant is hereby ordered to comply with and abide by the said
Award."'11 8 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed,
holding that the district court's determination "that it had the juris-
diction to enforce the crystal clear judgment of the Arbitrator was
106. 389 U.S. 64 (1967).
107. Id. at 67 n.3. The text of the award was as follows:
The contention of the Employer, the Philadelphia Marine Trade Association,
is hereby sustained and it is the Arbitrator's determination that Section 10(6) of
the Memorandum of Settlement dated February 11, 1965, providing gangs "ordered
for an 8 A.M. start Monday through Friday can be set back at 7:30 A.M. on the
date of work to commence at 1 P.M., at which time a 4 hour guarantee shall apply.
A 1 hour guarantee shall apply for the morning period unless employed during
the morning period," may be invoked by the Employer without qualification.
The contention of the Union, the International Longshoremen's Association,
Local 1291, that Section 10(6) of the Memorandum of Settlement dated February
11, 1965, referred to above, can only be invoked by the Employer because of non-
arrival of a vessel in port, is denied.
108. Id. at 69 n.5. The full text of the decree was as follows:
ORDER - September 15, 1965
And Now to Wit, This 15th day of September, 1965, after hearing, it is
hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Arbitrator's Award in the matter
of arbitration between the Philadelphia Marine Trade Association and Inter-
national Longshoremen's Association Local 1291, issued on June 11, 1965, be
specifically enforced by the defendant, International Longshoremen's Association
Local 1291, and the said defendant is hereby ordered to comply with and to abide
bv the said Award.
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sound and right. It was not in conflict with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act but completely within the Lincoln Mills and Steelworkers opinion,
...and a vital part of the all important enforcement of the specific
performance of the admittedly agreed to arbitration clause in the labor
contract before us."' 09 The Supreme Court reversed," 0 without reach-
ing the important labor law question involved, on the ground that
the district court's decree did not meet the specificity requirements
for injunctions contained in Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure :111
Whether or not the District Court's order was an "injunc-
tion" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it was an
equitable decree compelling obedience under the threat of con-
tempt and was therefore an "order granting an injunction" within
the meaning of Rule 65(d). [W]hatever power the District
Court might have possessed . . . the conclusion is inescapable
that the decree which the Court in fact entered was too vague
to be sustained .... 112
The majority of the Court thus avoided the real issue. But Mr.
Justice Douglas concurring in part and dissenting in part and Mr.
Justice Brennan concurring only in the result spoke their minds in
this area once again. Mr. Justice Douglas bemoaned the majority's
distinction between an "injunction" for purposes of Rule 65(d)
and an "injunction" for purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. "I
for one see no distinction; and since I feel strongly that Sinclair Re-
fining Co. v. Atkinson ... caused a severe dislocation in the federal
scheme of arbitration of labor disputes, I think we should not set our
feet on a path that may well lead to the eventual reaffirmation of the
principles of that case."' 113 Citing Lincoln Mills, Mr. Justice Douglas
continued:
109. 365 F.2d 295, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1966).
110. A subsequent decision fining the union for contempt of the order enforcing the
arbitration award was also reversed. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. Local 1291
I.L.A., 368 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1966), reV'd, 389 U.S. 64 (1967).
111. FXD. R. CIv. P. 65(d) provides:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth
the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable
detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts
sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in
active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order
by personal service or otherwise.
It is interesting to note that the next section of Rule 65 - Rule 65 (e) - although not
mentioned by the Court, states in pertinent part: "These rules do not modify any
statute of the United States relating to temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions in actions affecting employer and employee.
112. 389 U.S. at 73-74.
113. Id. at 77.
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[F]ailure to arbitrate was not part and parcel of the abuses
against which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed. We noted
that Congress, in fashioning § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, was seeking to encourage collective bargaining
agreements in which the parties agree to refrain from unilateral
disruptive action, such as a strike, with respect to disputes arbi-
trable by the agreement. Hence, if unions could break such
agreements with impunity, the congressional purpose might well
be frustrated. Although § 301 does not in terms address itself
to the question of remedies, it commands the District Court to
hold the parties to their contractual scheme for arbitration -
the "favored process for settlement," as my Brother BRENNAN
said in dissent in Sinclair .... I agree with his opinion that there
must be an accommodation between the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and all the other legislation on the books dealing with labor
relations. We have had such an accommodation in the case of
railroad disputes. . . . With respect to § 301, "Accommodation
requires only that the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia
not intrude into areas, not vital to its ends, where injunctive
relief is vital to a purpose of § 301; it does not require uncondi-
tional surrender.'
1 4
Mr Justice Douglas then drew the distinction between Sinclair
and P.M.T.A.:
We do not review here, as in Sinclair, a refusal to enter an
order prohibiting unilateral disruptive action on the part of a
union before that union has submitted its grievances to the arbitra-
tion procedure provided by the collective bargaining agreement.
Rather, the union in fact submitted to the arbitration procedure
established by the collective bargaining agreement but, if the alle-
gations are believed, totally frustrated the process by refusing to
abide by the arbitrator's decision. Such a "heads I win, tails you
lose," attitude plays fast and loose wih the desire of Congress to
encourage the peaceful and orderly settlement of labor disputes." 5
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in the result, stated: "But, like
my Brother Douglas, I emphasize that today's disposition in no way
implies that Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson . . . determines the
applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to an equitable decree care-
fully fashioned to enforce the award of an arbitrator authorized by
the parties to make final and binding interpretations of the collective
bargaining agreement."' "
114. Id. at 77-78. Mr. Justice Douglas was, of course, quoting Justice Brennan's
dissent in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 216-25 (1962).
115. 389 U.S. at 78-79.
116. Id. at 76.
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The stance adopted by Justices Douglas and Brennan on this
issue was certainly predictable in light of their opinions in Lincoln
Mills and Sinclair. However, the majority opinion in P.M.T.A.
reveals not a clue as to the position of any one of the remaining seven
Justices. Indeed, the Court, within the past year, denied a petition
for a writ of certiorari in a case which arose in the'Fifth Circuit
and which, following the Third Circuit's decision in P.M.T.A., pre-
sented precisely the same issue."' One can only hope that the Court
will see fit to decide the fate of injunctive arbitration awards - perhaps
the only remaining tool for the enforcement of no-strike clauses - in
the very near future.
ONE LINE OF REASONING
The key to the question of whether a judicial decree enforcing
an arbitration award, which enjoins a strike in breach of a labor
contract, constitutes an "injunction" within the meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, may, perhaps, be found, not in any supposed difference
in effect between an ordinary injunction and such a decree, but, rather,
in the language of the Act limiting its applicability to "any case involv-
ing or growing out of any labor dispute.""' 8 As is well known, Norris-
LaGuardia was enacted to take federal judges out of the business of
deciding the merits of labor disputes and issuing injunctions based
on their own social and economic views. Under the principles estab-
lished in the Steelworkers Trilogy, courts are prohibited from ex-
amining the merits of underlying industrial disputes in actions brought
to enforce or vacate labor arbitration awards. The judiciary can only
examine into the questions of the arbitrability of the controversy,
the arbitrator's authority to render the award, and the conduct of
the arbitrator, i.e., bias, prejudice, fraud. Thus, in a section 301 action
brought to enforce an arbitration award, the court is not asked to,
nor can it, embroil itself in the merits of the industrial dispute which
gave rise to the award. Hopefully, therefore, such an action may be
held not to constitute a case involving or arising out of a labor dispute.
In such case, whether a decree enforcing an arbitration award which
enjoins a strike in breach of contract is viewed as an "injunction"
or not, such decree would not have been issued in a case involving or
arising out of a labor dispute and accordingly would not be proscribed
by Norris-LaGuardia.
117. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Local 1418, I.L.A., 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
118. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
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This line of reasoning and its conclusion would have the unique
advantage of promoting both the effective enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements and the development of a uniform national
law of labor contracts as called for by section 301 and Lincoln Mills,
while, at the same time, being in no way inconsistent with the Court's
holding in Sinclair which involved only a raw labor dispute. Since
the Steelworkers Trilogy, it has become commonplace for courts
specifically to enforce arbitration awards in all but those cases involving
strikes or work stoppages." 9 Under the typical arbitration clause, a
strike in violation of a no-strike clause is generally considered to be
a matter for arbitration. 20  However, an arbitrator may issue an
award, having the force of an injunction, in a strike situation only
where the parties, by their contract, have granted him that power.12 '
This is so despite the Supreme Court's statement in United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Corp.,2  that an arbitrator is to bring his
informed judgment to bear upon an industrial dispute "especially . . .
when it comes to formulating remedies . . ." for the reason that the
arbitrator derives his powers solely from the contract between the
parties. Thus, were the Court to hold arbitration awards enjoining
strikes in breach of contracts judicially enforceable, employers would
seek in negotiating contracts, to have unions agree to confer injunctive
power upon arbitrators and, in the end, both the purpose of section
301 and the uniform enforcement of labor contracts and arbitration
awards would be substantially advanced. This, of course, assumes
that the Court would also find that an arbitration award in the nature
of an injunction would not contravene public policy as enunciated in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act and that arbitrators could act in an area
in which the federal courts - and ultimately perhaps, the state courts
as well - cannot act. But, as noted above, arbitration awards result
from the contracting parties' consent, not from governmental or judicial
intervention, and for this reason judicial enforcement of arbitration
awards upholding no-strike clauses may be found to be without the
evil at which Norris-LaGuardia was aimed.
Further, such a ruling would not only not conflict with the
holding in Sinclair but would harmonize that decision with both the
purpose of section 301 and the developing federal law of labor con-
tracts. In Sinclair an injunction was requested in a raw labor dispute
119. See, e.g., Drivers Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517 (1963) ; Local 453,
I.U.E.W. v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949(1963) ; Selb Mfg. Co. v. I.A.M. District 9, 305 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1962).
120. Cf. Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
121. See Gulf & South Am. S.S. Co. v. Maritime Union, 360 F.2d 63 (5th Cir.
1966); Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48 VA. L. R~v. 1199 (1962).
122. 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
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- the parties not having resorted to arbitration - the very sort
of case to which the prohibitions of Norris-LaGuardia against judicial
intervention were directed. Judicial enforcement of arbitration awards
enjoining strikes would not put the courts back in the thick of in-
dustrial disputes. The courts would enforce such awards, without
investigating the merits of the underlying disputes, provided only that
the awards were regularly and properly rendered. Such would be
in line with the present law regarding enforcement of all other sorts
of arbitration awards and would make enforceable, at the risk of
contempt, the union's promise not to strike during the term of a
collectively bargained labor contract. The advantages of such a result
seem obvious. One suspects that not even the unions could be heard
to complain about being required to live up to their no-strike promises.
But, of course, this line of reasoning must first prevail. 2 '
OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECIsIoNs
In addition to the Third Circuit, in its decision in P.M.T.A., at
least one other United States Courts of Appeals has specifically en-
forced an arbitration award enjoining a strike in breach of contract.
In New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Longshore Workers Local 1418,124
the Fifth Circuit specifically enforced an arbitration award ordering
an end to a union's work stoppages which were in violation of a labor
contract. The court distinguished Sinclair on the basis that that
case did not involve an arbitration award and "on the more than
semantical ground that there is a real difference 'between an ordinary
injunction and an order enforcing the award of an arbitrator although
the end result is the same."' 25 The court also found Norris-LaGuardia
inapplicable to the case before it for the reason that that Act "is
limited to labor disputes and we consider the instant controversy to be
outside the scope of a labor dispute as such.' 26 Stated the court:
We think the logic of the arbitration policy compels this
result; otherwise one of the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement containing arbitration and no strike or work stoppage
clauses has a hollow right indeed. He is told: Our national policy
is to encourage arbitration; you may contract to arbitrate and
obtain a no strike clause as the quid pro quo for your agreement
to arbitrate; a recalcitrant party will be compelled to arbitrate
any dispute arising therefrom; and the arbitrator may be em-
123. For another expression of this line of reasoning, see Note, Specific Enforce-
ment of An Arbitrator's Award Which has the Effect of Enjoining a Strike, 29 U.
Pir. L. Rigv. 517 (1968).
124. 389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
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powered contractually to issue a desist order. We do not believe
in light of the body of law which has grown from § 301 that
the law will now say to this party that, having done these things,
there is no remedy in the event the opposite party decides to
ignore the award of the arbitrator to desist the stoppage. No
such result should be imputed to Congress; the Supreme Court
did not go so far in Sinclair.'7
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California has very recently reached the same conclusion. In Pacific
Maritime Ass'n v. Longshoremen,128 that court, observing that in
Sinclair "there had been no arbitration resulting in an award" ,129
held that "where arbitration - as contemplated by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act - occurs, an accommodation between that
act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act is necessary, and thus this court
has jurisdiction to confirm and enforce the arbitrator's award in
this case."' 80
To the same effect is the New York Court of Appeals' decision in
Matter of Ruppert (Engelhofer),'8 l the leading state court decision
on this question. Enforcing an award which directed a union to end
a slowdown, which was in violation of its labor contract, the New
York Court of Appeals stated:
[O]nce we have held that this particular employer-union
agreement not only did not forbid but contemplated the inclusion
of an injunction in such an award, no ground remains for invali-
dating this injunction. Section 876-a, like its prototype the Federal
Norris-LaGuardia Act, was the result of union resentment against
the issuance of injunctions in labor strifes. But arbitration is
voluntary and there is no reason why unions and employers should
deny such powers to the special tribunals they themselves create.
Section 876-a and article 84 (Arbitration) are both in our Civil
Practice Act. Each represents a separate public policy and by
affirming here we harmonize those two policies.182
However, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York concluded to the contrary in Marine Transport Lines v.
Curran.'8 In that case, Judge McLean held that a suit brought
127. Id. See also New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Longshore Workers Local 1418, 49
L.R.R.M. 2941 (E.D. La. 1962); Johnson & Johnson v. Textile Workers Union, 184
F. Supp. 359 (D.N.J. 1960), which hold that a federal district court decreeing specific
performance of an arbitration clause also has power to issue an injunction to prevent
acts designed to frustrate its mandate.
128. 71 L.R.R.M. 3117 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
129. Id. at 3118.
130. Id. at 3119.
131. 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958).
132. Id. at 581-82, 148 N.E.2d at 131.
133. 65 L.R.R.M. 2095 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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under section 301 to enforce an arbitration award enjoining work
stoppages in violation of a labor contract constituted a case involving
or growing out of a labor dispute. The court expressly declined to
follow the Third Circuit's decision in P.M.T.A. Recognizing that
Sinclair did not involve the enforcement of an arbitration award, the
court, nevertheless, held Sinclair applicable:
In my opinion, there is no significant difference between
the two situations, as far as the power of this court is concerned.
It inevitably follows from Sinclair that this court lacks juris-
diction to grant the relief requested here. . . .If it be said that
this conclusion impairs the efficacy of no strike clauses and arbitra-
tion clauses in collective bargaining agreements, and I agree that
it does to a certain extent, the answer can only be, as the Supreme
Court held in Sinclair, that the remedy lies with Congress and
not with the courts.
18 4
A wholly different approach to this problem was adopted by Judge
Fullam of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania in Tanker Service Committee, Inc. v. Masters, Local 14.185
In this case the typical suit for enforcement of the arbitrator's award
was instituted under section 301. The arbitrator had ordered an end
to a strike in violation of the parties' contract. The court, troubled
by the status of the Third Circuit's decision in P.M.T.A., for the
reason that the Supreme Court had earlier agreed to hear that case,
but had not yet done so, declined to follow P.M.T.A., but nevertheless
concluded that it had "jurisdiction to confirm the arbitrator's award
so as to give it at least the effect of a judgment establishing liability
for damages on the part of the respondent union."'"" The court entered
"a conditional, partial judgment" for compensatory damages in the
amount of $250,000 against the striking union, providing that the
judgment would become effective only if the union failed to return
to work and to arbitration of the underlying dispute within forty-eight
hours. The court's judgment further provided that if the union met
the conditions the judgment would be vacated, but if the union failed
to meet the conditions the judgment would become effective and the
court would proceed to determine the full amount of damages sus-
tained by the employer association and thereafter enter a final judg-
ment for such amount. The court also ordered the union to pay any
and all damages assessed against it into the registry of the court so that
134. Id. at 2097.
135. 269 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1968).
136. Brief for Appellant at 39a, Tanker Service Committee, Inc. v. Masters Local
14, 394 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1968).
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any damage award would not "become just one more item for negotia-
tion at the next round of bargaining' 1 7 and might have coercive effect
upon the union to terminate the strike. The union met the conditions
imposed by the court in its "conditional, partial judgment" and the
decision was dismissed on appeal to the Third Circuit as moot. 3 '
This novel utilization of a contract-damage theory to enforce
compliance with an arbitration award, enjoining a strike in breach
of contract, may, however, run afoul of the rule that damages for a
union's breach of a no-strike clause are generally to be determined
by an arbitrator, in the first instance, as presenting a question subject
to the typical broad arbitration clause contained in most agreements.
The employer, of course, must however have access to the grievance
machinery of the contract if his damage action is to be stayed pending
arbitration. 13'9 The damages conditionally assessed against the striking
union in Tanker Service were nothing more or less than ordinary
compensatory damages normally recoverable in a section 301 damage
suit. The difference between recovery of damages in such a suit and
the conditional damage award rendered in Tanker Service, of course,
lies in the speed with which the latter award was made and the coercive
effect which such an award will have when the damages are immediately
to be paid into the court's registry and to remain subject to the
court's jurisdiction for disbursement purposes.
In Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Local 50,14' the Supreme Court held
that an employer's section 301 damage action for a union's breach of
its no-strike clause was to be stayed, pending submission to an arbitra-
tor, where the parties' contract contained a very broad arbitration
provision, and it could not be said that the union had "flatly repu-
diate[d] the provision for arbitration.' 1 4' Looking beyond the specific
holding in Drake Bakeries, it seems clear that a union's "flat repu-
diation" of its agreement to arbitrate, entitling an employer "to declare
its promise to arbitrate forever discharged or to refuse to arbitrate
137. 269 F. Supp. at 553.
138. 394 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1968). In Ormet Corp. v. United Steelworkers, __ F.
Supp. -- (W.D. Pa. 1969), the district court enjoined an imminent strike pending
arbitration of the dispute. On appeal, the third circuit stayed the injunctive relief but
directed that the district court require the union to post a bond. Ormet Corp. v.
United Steelworkers, --- F.2d (3d Cir. 1969). The district court thereafter
required the union to post an $8,000,000. bond. It is submitted that requiring the union
to post a substantial bond might well constitute a method of maintaining the viability
of no-strike clauses, particularly where no initial determination of the dispute has
been made by the arbitrator.
139. Compare G.T. Schjeldahl Co. v. Local 1680, I.A.M., 393 F.2d 502 (lst Cir.
1968) (only employee grievances arbitrable - no stay) with Warehouse Co. v. I.L.A.,
404 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1968) (employer grievances arbitrable - stay granted).
140. 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
141. Id. at 263 n.10.
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its damage claims against the union, '1 4 2 is not likely to be f'und;148
while the standard arbitration clause, providing for both union and
employer grievances, is generally to be read to include claims for
damages for breaches of no-strike clauses as arbitrable matters absent
express exclusion of such cases from the arbitration provision. 144 With
this as the law, the sort of contract-damage remedy employed in
Tanker Service, as a substitute for specific enforcement of an arbi-
tration award enjoining a strike in breach of contract, may be expected
to be short-lived. For, although the conditional award of damages
made in Tanker Service was not rendered in a damage action, the
damages assessed constituted the compensatory damages to which the
employer would have been entitled in a damage action. Thus, despite
the attractiveness of the remedy fashioned in Tanker Service for
employers, Drake Bakeries would appear to preclude its continued
utilization.
This, then, leaves the all-important question of the judicial en-
forceability of arbitration awards, enjoining strikes in breach of con-
tract, totally unresolved, except in the Third and Fifth Circuits where
such awards have been enforced. It may be predicted that the Court
will continue to leave this question unresolved until such time as it
rules on the applicability of Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction
provisions to state court section 301 actions.
CONCLUSION
Given Lincoln Mills' holding that section 301 is substantive in
nature, as well as jurisdictional, there can be no serious quarrel with
Avco's grant of federal removal in state court instituted section 301
actions. But Lincoln Mills' mandate that a uniform body of federal
law governing section 301 suits be established ought not be read to
make Norris-LaGuardia applicable to the states. Norris-LaGuardia
was addressed solely to the federal courts at a time when Congress'
power to regulate labor relations under the commerce clause was
doubted. Further, it was aimed at an entirely different situation in
an entirely different age. While the framers of section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act refused to repeal the strictures of Norris-LaGuardia with
respect to actions brought under that section, they made it perfectly
142. Id. at 265.
143. See Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247, 251(1964), which reaffirms Drake Bakeries' language: "[U]nder this contract, by agree-
ing to arbitrate all claims without excluding the case where the union struck over an
arbitrable matter, the parties have negatived any intention to condition the duty to
arbitrate upon the absence of strikes."
144. This, of course, is in accord with the Court's holdings in the Steelworkers
Trilogy of arbitration cases.
FALL 1969]
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plain, as the Supreme Court acknowledged in Dowd Box, that state
court jurisdiction over section 301 actions was to continue unimpaired
under the "usual processes of law." Federal removal, under Avco, need
not defeat the states' equitable jurisdiction in this area if the federal
courts are to apply applicable state law to state court instituted section
301 actions. However, if federal removal is to mean the application
of Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction provisions to removed state court
section 301 actions, under the uniformity doctrine of Lincoln Mills,
specific enforcement of no-strike clauses, in the absence of an arbitration
award, will be effectively abolished.
In this event, it can be anticipated that mounting pressure from
Congress and elsewhere will be brought to bear upon the Court to
uphold judicial enforcement of arbitration awards, enjoining strikes
in breach of labor agreements, as the only remaining vehicle for the
enforcement of no-strike clauses. Should the Court, however, turn a
deaf ear to these voices and hold Norris-LaGuardia applicable to such
injunctive arbitration awards, Congress may be expected to react
legislatively to rescue section 301 and the effective enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements from so tortured and ignoble a de-
mise. Otherwise, Congress' plain purpose in enacting section 301,
which was to make collective bargaining agreements, including arbitra-
tion and no-strike clauses, more enforceable - not less enforceable -
than they were in 1947, will have been completely sacrificed upon the
judicially constructed altar of federal uniformity of labor contract law.
The total unenforceability 45 of no-strike clauses would contra-
dict the fundamental purpose of all federal labor legislation which is,
of course, to promote industrial peace and tranquility, would under-
mine the entire collective bargaining system and, would exacerbate
an already intolerable situation. The Court can avoid this result,
even if it should eventually hold Norris-LaGuardia applicable to states
or to federally removed state court section 301 actions, by simply
upholding the judicial enforceability of arbitration awards enjoining
strikes in breach of labor agreements. Such a ruling would harmonize
the conflict between the developing uniform, national law of labor con-
tracts and the effective enforcement of collective bargaining agreements
and would be wholly consistent with all of the Court's prior decisions.
145. This Article has neither attempted to deal with the question of remedies -
other than injunction - available to an employer upon a union s breach of a no-strike
clause nor has it considered the special issues raised by strikes by public employees.
For a good analysis of the former, including damage actions and disciplinary measures
against employees as alternative remedies, see Spelfogel, Enforcement of No-Strike
Clause by Injunction, Damage Action and Discipline, 7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 239,
252-58 (1966). For a fine discussion of the latter, see Bloedorn, Strike and the Public
Sector, 20 LAB. L.J. 151 (1969).
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It is suggested and anticipated that this is the route which the Court
will choose to follow, within the next few years, in order to avoid the
total unenforceability of no-strike clauses and the widespread uproar
which would otherwise surely and justifiably eventuate in both Congress
and the states. Such a ruling may, for obvious reasons, be expected
to follow close upon the heels of any decision by the Court holding
Norris-LaGuardia applicable to states or to federally removed state
court section 301 actions.
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